From patchwork Tue Oct 4 10:54:42 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Adolf Belka X-Patchwork-Id: 6039 Return-Path: Received: from mail01.ipfire.org (mail01.haj.ipfire.org [172.28.1.202]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-384) client-signature ECDSA (P-384)) (Client CN "mail01.haj.ipfire.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by web04.haj.ipfire.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4MhZNB34mNz3wcJ for ; Tue, 4 Oct 2022 10:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail02.haj.ipfire.org (mail02.haj.ipfire.org [172.28.1.201]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-384) server-digest SHA384 client-signature ECDSA (P-384) client-digest SHA384) (Client CN "mail02.haj.ipfire.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mail01.ipfire.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4MhZN90H9jz2JX; Tue, 4 Oct 2022 10:54:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail02.haj.ipfire.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail02.haj.ipfire.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4MhZN85Pp2z2xrP; Tue, 4 Oct 2022 10:54:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail01.ipfire.org (mail01.haj.ipfire.org [172.28.1.202]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-384) server-digest SHA384 client-signature ECDSA (P-384) client-digest SHA384) (Client CN "mail01.haj.ipfire.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mail02.haj.ipfire.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4MhZN80VS2z2xPQ for ; Tue, 4 Oct 2022 10:54:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-384) server-digest SHA384) (No client certificate requested) by mail01.ipfire.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4MhZN71Bk4znV; Tue, 4 Oct 2022 10:54:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ipfire.org; s=202003ed25519; t=1664880887; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3gLkIjJdecu1kYTzaQF1u8FccKBVrihLcvjFPOtKG4U=; b=nRfJ+njfQRSkW7Dg7EFniRMMDuONRhEciqweZg1UsvVhlbnf0mDARnTSZpCu7Rx/Zb9Wux wja3JOix47Z+coCQ== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ipfire.org; s=202003rsa; t=1664880887; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3gLkIjJdecu1kYTzaQF1u8FccKBVrihLcvjFPOtKG4U=; b=tHWePc9C1R/VGZ2FRRdvIzc2M5kQx34O9nPgQuPeX+7rui6cHv5URDroX3yRFlqWDCORwb rMhsk7SCivACM4TreKalJFqwhKdYagYzj276sjTvKLCPstyX+M7wJKxl2O06yylLV821Ku oMAHO1a27qj5rnQZjdF6xKufK6Y9TJX2x92YxTcDjG8zxY+iBwla5uWjdzi+vP4vptTtak n1rXRS6i3DC/eYeSdlB9sNEtLCvoxvxRGWhtpLfSE29GUQnVGtH/24mwSonBhKzd5uw5rc BryprKL54KsHVR8m5Nmrd0wFPNUzRBkY6f6Q29KCBMOLSHCP1BEbdGo7SzZu1A== From: Adolf Belka To: development@lists.ipfire.org Subject: [PATCH] rsync: Update to version 3.2.6 and fix Bug#12947 Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 12:54:42 +0200 Message-Id: <20221004105442.3649212-1-adolf.belka@ipfire.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: development@lists.ipfire.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: IPFire development talk List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: development-bounces@lists.ipfire.org Sender: "Development" - Update from version 3.2.4 plus CVE-2022-29154 patch to 3.2.6 - Patch for CVE-2022-29154 applied in CU170 turned out to have a bug within it causing rsync to fail with an error. Four additional commits were done to fix this bug and its consequences but these were all applied in the rsync git repo after the patch had been merged into CU170. - Version 3.2.5 onwards contains the CVE-2022-29154 fix and associated commits. - No update of rootfile required. - Changelog NEWS for rsync 3.2.6 (9 Sep 2022) BUG FIXES: More path-cleaning improvements in the file-list validation code to avoid rejecting of valid args. A file-list validation fix for a --files-from file that ends without a line-terminating character. Added a safety check that prevents the sender from removing destination files when a local copy using --remove-source-files has some files that are shared between the sending & receiving hierarchies, including the case where the source dir & destination dir are identical. Fixed a bug in the internal MD4 checksum code that could cause the digest to be sporadically incorrect (the openssl version was/is fine). A minor tweak to rrsync added "copy-devices" to the list of known args, but left it disabled by default. ENHANCEMENTS: Rename --protect-args to --secluded-args to make it clearer how it differs from the default backslash-escaped arg-protecting behavior of rsync. The old option names are still accepted. The environment-variable override did not change its name. PACKAGING RELATED: The configure option --with-protected-args was renamed to --with-secluded-args. This option makes --secluded-args the default rsync behavior instead of using backslash escaping for protecting args. The mkgitver script now makes sure that a .git dir/file is in the top-level source dir before calling git describe. It also runs a basic check on the version value. This should avoid using an unrelated git description for rsync's version. DEVELOPER RELATED: The configure script no longer sets the -⁠pedantic-errors CFLAG (which it used to try to do only for gcc). The name_num_obj struct was modified to allow its dynamic name_num_item list to be initialized in a better way. NEWS for rsync 3.2.5 (14 Aug 2022) SECURITY FIXES: Added some file-list safety checking that helps to ensure that a rogue sending rsync can't add unrequested top-level names and/or include recursive names that should have been excluded by the sender. These extra safety checks only require the receiver rsync to be updated. When dealing with an untrusted sending host, it is safest to copy into a dedicated destination directory for the remote content (i.e. don't copy into a destination directory that contains files that aren't from the remote host unless you trust the remote host). Fixes CVE-2022-29154. A fix for CVE-2022-37434 in the bundled zlib (buffer overflow issue). BUG FIXES: Fixed the handling of filenames specified with backslash-quoted wildcards when the default remote-arg-escaping is enabled. Fixed the configure check for signed char that was causing a host that defaults to unsigned characters to generate bogus rolling checksums. This made rsync send mostly literal data for a copy instead of finding matching data in the receiver's basis file (for a file that contains high-bit characters). Lots of manpage improvements, including an attempt to better describe how include/exclude filters work. If rsync is compiled with an xxhash 0.8 library and then moved to a system with a dynamically linked xxhash 0.7 library, we now detect this and disable the XX3 hashes (since these routines didn't stabilize until 0.8). ENHANCEMENTS: The --trust-sender option was added as a way to bypass the extra file-list safety checking (should that be required). PACKAGING RELATED: A note to those wanting to patch older rsync versions: the changes in this release requires the quoted argument change from 3.2.4. Then, you'll want every single code change from 3.2.5 since there is no fluff in this release. The build date that goes into the manpages is now based on the developer's release date, not on the build's local-timezone interpretation of the date. DEVELOPER RELATED: Configure now defaults GETGROUPS_T to gid_t when cross compiling. Configure now looks for the bsd/string.h include file in order to fix the build on a host that has strlcpy() in the main libc but not defined in the main string.h file. Signed-off-by: Adolf Belka Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer --- lfs/rsync | 9 +- src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch | 322 ------------------------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 328 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch diff --git a/lfs/rsync b/lfs/rsync index c27258929..07a56f96d 100644 --- a/lfs/rsync +++ b/lfs/rsync @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ include Config SUMMARY = Versatile tool for fast incremental file transfer -VER = 3.2.4 +VER = 3.2.6 THISAPP = rsync-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE) DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP) TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP) PROG = rsync -PAK_VER = 15 +PAK_VER = 16 DEPS = @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = a67fcb9619874f1c5346a876138e59f4bf508a90736f830fb2b4eaf180ab11f15a0a7db9b3b28c3b990b77c2b0973d8e668bf509e4134f464159ed3172f53d80 +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = fa0c4aa9cdffbc9ffd4f81e8c3cdc1fda7080f80c1923084c6d705e6872caaba31c13de4603c9462f312dbbdae76520c27d3f4f40b327f1e66c7127b1d05ea73 install : $(TARGET) @@ -85,9 +85,6 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) # Replace shebang in rsync-ssl cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i -e "s@^#!.*@#!/bin/bash@" rsync-ssl - # Fix for CVE-2022-29154 - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch - cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure \ --prefix=/usr \ --without-included-popt \ diff --git a/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch b/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d3b4499a4..000000000 --- a/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -commit b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 -Author: Wayne Davison -Date: Sun Jul 31 16:55:34 2022 -0700 - - Some extra file-list safety checks. - -diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c -index 39073a0c..b670c8ba 100644 ---- a/exclude.c -+++ b/exclude.c -@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server; - extern int am_sender; - extern int eol_nulls; - extern int io_error; -+extern int xfer_dirs; -+extern int recurse; - extern int local_server; - extern int prune_empty_dirs; - extern int ignore_perishable; -+extern int old_style_args; -+extern int relative_paths; - extern int delete_mode; - extern int delete_excluded; - extern int cvs_exclude; - extern int sanitize_paths; - extern int protocol_version; -+extern int list_only; - extern int module_id; - -+extern char *filesfrom_host; - extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; - extern unsigned int curr_dir_len; - extern unsigned int module_dirlen; -@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen; - filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" }; - filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" }; - filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" }; -+filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" }; - - int saw_xattr_filter = 0; -+int trust_sender_filter = 0; - - /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */ - #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16) -@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_ - } - } - -+/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include -+ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */ -+void add_implied_include(const char *arg) -+{ -+ filter_rule *rule; -+ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0; -+ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */ -+ const char *cp; -+ char *p; -+ if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL) -+ return; -+ if (relative_paths) { -+ cp = strstr(arg, "/./"); -+ if (cp) -+ arg = cp+3; -+ } else { -+ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL) -+ arg = cp + 1; -+ } -+ arg_len = strlen(arg); -+ if (arg_len) { -+ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) { -+ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */ -+ cp = arg; -+ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) { -+ arg_len++; -+ cp++; -+ } -+ saw_wild = 1; -+ } -+ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */ -+ rule = new0(filter_rule); -+ if (!implied_filter_list.head) -+ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule; -+ else { -+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; -+ implied_filter_list.head = rule; -+ } -+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0); -+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1); -+ *p++ = '/'; -+ cp = arg; -+ while (*cp) { -+ switch (*cp) { -+ case '\\': -+ backslash_cnt++; -+ if (saw_wild) -+ *p++ = '\\'; -+ *p++ = *cp++; -+ break; -+ case '/': -+ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */ -+ break; -+ if (relative_paths) { -+ filter_rule const *ent; -+ int found = 0; -+ *p = '\0'; -+ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) { -+ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0) -+ found = 1; -+ } -+ if (!found) { -+ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule); -+ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0); -+ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern); -+ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt; -+ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; -+ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule; -+ } -+ } -+ slash_cnt++; -+ *p++ = *cp++; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *p++ = *cp++; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ *p = '\0'; -+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt; -+ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern; -+ } -+ -+ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) { -+ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */ -+ rule = new0(filter_rule); -+ if (recurse) -+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2; -+ else -+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD; -+ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */ -+ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) { -+ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */ -+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1); -+ cp = arg; -+ while (*cp) { -+ if (*cp == '\\') -+ *p++ = '\\'; -+ *p++ = *cp++; -+ } -+ } else { -+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1); -+ if (arg_len) { -+ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len); -+ p += arg_len; -+ } -+ } -+ if (p[-1] != '/') -+ *p++ = '/'; -+ *p++ = '*'; -+ if (recurse) -+ *p++ = '*'; -+ *p = '\0'; -+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1; -+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; -+ implied_filter_list.head = rule; -+ } -+} -+ - /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */ - static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp) - { -@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name, - : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory" - : "file"; - rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n", -- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)], -+ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)], - t, name, ent->pattern, - ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type); - } -@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const char **rulestr_ptr, - } - switch (ch) { - case ':': -+ trust_sender_filter = 1; - rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE - | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP; - /* FALL THROUGH */ -diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c -index 1ba306bc..0e6bf782 100644 ---- a/flist.c -+++ b/flist.c -@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist; - extern int sender_symlink_iconv; - extern int output_needs_newline; - extern int sender_keeps_checksum; -+extern int trust_sender_filter; - extern int unsort_ndx; - extern uid_t our_uid; - extern struct stats stats; -@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; - - extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes; - --extern filter_rule_list filter_list; --extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; -+extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list; - - #ifdef ICONV_OPTION - extern int filesfrom_convert; -@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x - exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED); - } - -+ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') { -+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE; -+ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */ -+ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) { -+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname); -+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); -+ } -+ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) { -+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname); -+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); -+ } -+ } -+ - if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) { - if (one_file_system) { - /* Room to save the dir's device for -x */ -diff --git a/io.c b/io.c -index cf94cee7..a6e3ed30 100644 ---- a/io.c -+++ b/io.c -@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void) - while (s != eob) { - if (*s++ == '\0') { - ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1; -+ add_implied_include(sob); - if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0) - exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */ - write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */ -@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void) - char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos; - char *t = ff_xb.buf; - char *eob = f + len; -+ char *cur = t; - /* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */ - while (f != eob) { - if (!(*t++ = *f++)) { -+ add_implied_include(cur); -+ cur = t; - while (f != eob && *f == '\0') - f++; - } -diff --git a/main.c b/main.c -index 58920a2d..5a7fbdd7 100644 ---- a/main.c -+++ b/main.c -@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len; - extern int basis_dir_cnt; - extern int default_af_hint; - extern int stdout_format_has_i; -+extern int trust_sender_filter; - extern struct stats stats; - extern char *stdout_format; - extern char *logfile_format; -@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; - extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN]; - extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1]; - extern struct file_list *first_flist; --extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; -+extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list; - - uid_t our_uid; - gid_t our_gid; -@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in - #ifdef ICONV_CONST - setup_iconv(); - #endif -+ trust_sender_filter = 1; - } else if (local_server) { - /* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force - * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */ -@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[]) - char *dummy_host; - int dummy_port = rsync_port; - int i; -+ if (filesfrom_fd < 0) -+ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]); - /* For remote source, any extra source args must have either - * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */ - for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) { -@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[]) - if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */ - arg = "."; - remote_argv[i] = arg; -+ add_implied_include(arg); - } - } - -diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c -index b3a69da0..93cf8efd 100644 ---- a/receiver.c -+++ b/receiver.c -@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) - if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1)) - rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname); - -- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0') -- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) { -- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n"); -- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); -+ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) { -+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE; -+ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) { -+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n", -+ fname); -+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); -+ } - } - - #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS