[1/4] Tor: Enable syscall sandbox

Message ID c3117283-a083-01ad-0649-05da5bfa8b0d@ipfire.org
State Accepted
Commit 0b6a2e761bc14d90725beda5b31f1637a599d163
Headers
Series [1/4] Tor: Enable syscall sandbox |

Commit Message

Peter Müller Sept. 25, 2021, 7:07 a.m. UTC
  This makes post-exploitation activities harder, in case the local Tor
instance has been compromised. It is worth noticing that Tor won't
respond to a "GETINFO address" command on the control port if sandboxed,
but our CGI does not make use of it, and neither is any legitimate
service on IPFire doing so.

Tested on a small middle relay running on an IPFire machine.

Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
---
 html/cgi-bin/tor.cgi | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
  

Patch

diff --git a/html/cgi-bin/tor.cgi b/html/cgi-bin/tor.cgi
index 3349336ae..ce579aec1 100644
--- a/html/cgi-bin/tor.cgi
+++ b/html/cgi-bin/tor.cgi
@@ -730,6 +730,7 @@  sub BuildConfiguration() {
 	open(FILE, ">$torrc");
 
 	# Global settings.
+	print FILE "Sandbox 1\n";
 	print FILE "ControlPort $TOR_CONTROL_PORT\n";
 
 	if ($settings{'TOR_ENABLED'} eq 'on') {