diff mbox series

[1/3] Unbound: Enable DNS cache poisoning mitigation

Message ID 96863f17-bb80-2cdc-cb55-2ca06a9cc673@link38.eu
State Superseded
Headers
Series [1/3] Unbound: Enable DNS cache poisoning mitigation |

Commit Message

Peter Müller Aug. 20, 2018, 4:08 a.m. UTC 
  By default, Unbound neither keeps track of the number of unwanted
replies nor initiates countermeasures if they become too large (DNS
cache poisoning).

This sets the maximum number of tolerated unwanted replies to
5M, causing the cache to be flushed afterwards. (Upstream documentation
recommends 10M as a threshold, but this turned out to be ineffective
against attacks in the wild.)

See https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/unbound.conf/ for
details.

Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
---
 config/unbound/unbound.conf | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

Comments

Michael Tremer Aug. 23, 2018, 11:39 p.m. UTC | #1 
Do you have any reference for this?

On Sun, 2018-08-19 at 20:08 +0200, Peter Müller wrote:
> By default, Unbound neither keeps track of the number of unwanted
> replies nor initiates countermeasures if they become too large (DNS
> cache poisoning).
> 
> This sets the maximum number of tolerated unwanted replies to
> 5M, causing the cache to be flushed afterwards. (Upstream documentation
> recommends 10M as a threshold, but this turned out to be ineffective
> against attacks in the wild.)
> 
> See https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/unbound.conf/ for
> details.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
> ---
>  config/unbound/unbound.conf | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/config/unbound/unbound.conf b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> index 3f724d8f7..fa2ca3fd4 100644
> --- a/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> +++ b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ server:
>  	harden-algo-downgrade: no
>  	use-caps-for-id: no
>  
> +	# Harden against DNS cache poisoning
> +	unwanted-reply-threshold: 5000000
> +
>  	# Listen on all interfaces
>  	interface-automatic: yes
>  	interface: 0.0.0.0
Peter Müller Aug. 24, 2018, 5:22 a.m. UTC | #2 
Well, some people consider 10k a good value for this:
https://calomel.org/unbound_dns.html

Not sure if this is actually too low. During some attacks, 5M
was satisfying here, but I did not dig into thresholds deeper.
Simulated attacks did not show a unique behaviour, and their
real value is questionable in my point of view.

What do you propose for the value? 1M or 100k?

Best regards,
Peter Müller

> Do you have any reference for this?
> 
> On Sun, 2018-08-19 at 20:08 +0200, Peter Müller wrote:
>> By default, Unbound neither keeps track of the number of unwanted
>> replies nor initiates countermeasures if they become too large (DNS
>> cache poisoning).
>>
>> This sets the maximum number of tolerated unwanted replies to
>> 5M, causing the cache to be flushed afterwards. (Upstream documentation
>> recommends 10M as a threshold, but this turned out to be ineffective
>> against attacks in the wild.)
>>
>> See https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/unbound.conf/ for
>> details.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
>> ---
>>  config/unbound/unbound.conf | 3 +++
>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/config/unbound/unbound.conf b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> index 3f724d8f7..fa2ca3fd4 100644
>> --- a/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> +++ b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ server:
>>  	harden-algo-downgrade: no
>>  	use-caps-for-id: no
>>  
>> +	# Harden against DNS cache poisoning
>> +	unwanted-reply-threshold: 5000000
>> +
>>  	# Listen on all interfaces
>>  	interface-automatic: yes
>>  	interface: 0.0.0.0
>
Michael Tremer Aug. 24, 2018, 9:52 p.m. UTC | #3 
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Hash: SHA512

1M sounds good.

This should never become a problem for zones that use DNSSEC.

On Thu, 2018-08-23 at 21:22 +0200, Peter Müller wrote:
> Well, some people consider 10k a good value for this:
> https://calomel.org/unbound_dns.html
> 
> Not sure if this is actually too low. During some attacks, 5M
> was satisfying here, but I did not dig into thresholds deeper.
> Simulated attacks did not show a unique behaviour, and their
> real value is questionable in my point of view.
> 
> What do you propose for the value? 1M or 100k?
> 
> Best regards,
> Peter Müller
> 
> > Do you have any reference for this?
> > 
> > On Sun, 2018-08-19 at 20:08 +0200, Peter Müller wrote:
> > > By default, Unbound neither keeps track of the number of unwanted
> > > replies nor initiates countermeasures if they become too large (DNS
> > > cache poisoning).
> > > 
> > > This sets the maximum number of tolerated unwanted replies to
> > > 5M, causing the cache to be flushed afterwards. (Upstream documentation
> > > recommends 10M as a threshold, but this turned out to be ineffective
> > > against attacks in the wild.)
> > > 
> > > See https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/unbound.conf/ for
> > > details.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
> > > ---
> > >  config/unbound/unbound.conf | 3 +++
> > >  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/config/unbound/unbound.conf b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> > > index 3f724d8f7..fa2ca3fd4 100644
> > > --- a/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> > > +++ b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
> > > @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ server:
> > >  	harden-algo-downgrade: no
> > >  	use-caps-for-id: no
> > >  
> > > +	# Harden against DNS cache poisoning
> > > +	unwanted-reply-threshold: 5000000
> > > +
> > >  	# Listen on all interfaces
> > >  	interface-automatic: yes
> > >  	interface: 0.0.0.0
> 
> 
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Peter Müller Aug. 27, 2018, 4:35 a.m. UTC | #4 
Hello Michael,

could you merge the series with the second version of this patch
then?

Thanks, and best regards,
Peter Müller 

> 1M sounds good.
> 
> This should never become a problem for zones that use DNSSEC.
> 
> On Thu, 2018-08-23 at 21:22 +0200, Peter Müller wrote:
>> Well, some people consider 10k a good value for this:
>> https://calomel.org/unbound_dns.html
> 
>> Not sure if this is actually too low. During some attacks, 5M
>> was satisfying here, but I did not dig into thresholds deeper.
>> Simulated attacks did not show a unique behaviour, and their
>> real value is questionable in my point of view.
> 
>> What do you propose for the value? 1M or 100k?
> 
>> Best regards,
>> Peter Müller
> [snip]
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/config/unbound/unbound.conf b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
index 3f724d8f7..fa2ca3fd4 100644
--- a/config/unbound/unbound.conf
+++ b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@  server:
 	harden-algo-downgrade: no
 	use-caps-for-id: no
 
+	# Harden against DNS cache poisoning
+	unwanted-reply-threshold: 5000000
+
 	# Listen on all interfaces
 	interface-automatic: yes
 	interface: 0.0.0.0