| Message ID | 20180120152857.538069c6.peter.mueller@link38.eu |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Headers |
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| Series |
set OpenSSL DEFAULT cipher list to secure value
|
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Commit Message
Peter Müller
Jan. 21, 2018, 1:28 a.m. UTC
Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list:
* ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable
* TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older
* weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated
* AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" problem)
* ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list
The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"):
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1
AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256
AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1
AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1
This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/devel/telco/2017-12-04).
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
---
lfs/openssl | 2 +-
src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch
Comments
Hello, since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's say a week. Best, -Michael On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" problem) > * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > > The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1 > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 > AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1 > > This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/devel/telco/2017-12-04). > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > --- > lfs/openssl | 2 +- > src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > --- a/lfs/openssl > +++ b/lfs/openssl > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > > # i586 specific patches > diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 +0100 > +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when > + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. > + */ > +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > + /* > + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: > Hello, > > since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort > of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's > say a week. > > Best, > -Michael > > On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > > Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > > * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > > * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > > * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > > * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" > > problem) > > * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > > > > The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > Mac=SHA1 > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > Mac=SHA1 > > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) > > Mac=AEAD > > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > Mac=AEAD > > AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > Mac=SHA1 > > AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve > > l/telco/2017-12-04). > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > > Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > > --- > > lfs/openssl | 2 +- > > src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > > index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > > --- a/lfs/openssl > > +++ b/lfs/openssl > > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst > > %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > > @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf > > $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > > - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > > + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > > > > # i586 specific patches > > diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > > +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > > +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 > > 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > > ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 > > +0100 > > +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > > + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is > > substituted when > > + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with > > 'DEFAULT'. > > + */ > > +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > > ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: > > !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > > + /* > > + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in > > ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > > + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for > > DEFAULT is Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. Best, Paul Simmons
What would be the negative implications of this patch? Would existing tunnels on production servers stop working? > On Jan 21, 2018, at 2:55 PM, Paul Simmons <mbatranch@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: >> Hello, >> >> since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort >> of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's >> say a week. >> >> Best, >> -Michael >> >>> On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: >>> Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: >>> * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable >>> * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older >>> * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated >>> * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" >>> problem) >>> * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list >>> >>> The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): >>> >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA >>> Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 >>> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) >>> Mac=SHA1 >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 >>> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) >>> Mac=SHA1 >>> AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) >>> Mac=AEAD >>> AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 >>> AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) >>> Mac=AEAD >>> AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 >>> AES256-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 >>> CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) >>> Mac=SHA1 >>> AES128-SHA SSLv3 >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 >>> CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) >>> Mac=SHA1 >>> >>> This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve >>> l/telco/2017-12-04). >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> >>> Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> >>> --- >>> lfs/openssl | 2 +- >>> src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ >>> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch >>> >>> diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl >>> index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 >>> --- a/lfs/openssl >>> +++ b/lfs/openssl >>> @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst >>> %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) >>> @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf >>> $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch >>> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch >>> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch >>> >>> # i586 specific patches >>> diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch >>> b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch >>> new file mode 100644 >>> index 000000000..9fb4051e3 >>> --- /dev/null >>> +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch >>> @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ >>> +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h >>> +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 >>> 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 >>> ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 >>> +0100 >>> +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ >>> + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is >>> substituted when >>> + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with >>> 'DEFAULT'. >>> + */ >>> +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST >>> "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" >>> ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST >>> "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: >>> !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" >>> + /* >>> + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in >>> ssl/ssl_ciph.c always >>> + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for >>> DEFAULT is > > Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security > discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to > best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. > > Best, > Paul Simmons
Hello *, thanks for the comments. To avoid some misunderstandings here: The patch changes the content of the DEFAULT cipher list of OpenSSL. This list is used by programs such as curl and wget for establishing TLS sessions. As far as I know, it does not have effect on VPN components such as IPsec. Further, insecure algorithm (3DES, RC4, MD5, ...) are still supported by OpenSSL, since we have not disabled them during the compilation support, which I aim to do in another patch. In case a program uses one of those algorithm, it still works. This is because the DEFAULT cipher list does not contain all ciphers supported by OpenSSL, but those which are chosen if no specific algorithm keywords (HIGH, !aNULL, ...) are used. The negative impacts of this patch are: (a) It might break TLS connections to _very_ outdated server which still require weak and/or broken ciphers. But, as it was in similar situations, that is the problem of those who operate the servers. At the moment, I am not aware of such servers IPFire connects to by default. Please drop me a line if I missed one. (b) Looking at the cipher list attached to the patch, you probably notice that TLS 1.2 ciphers without PFS (AES256-GCM and similar) are listed after TLS 1.0 ciphers with PFS. While this does not necessarily have performance impacts, it is - with regard to security - a matter of discussion. In my point of view, it is better to use a cipher provides PFS (the transmitted contents cannot be decrypted afterwards) but uses a weak message digest algorithm (SHA1) than using a TLS 1.2 cipher with secure algos, but an attacker "just" need to steal the private key and is able to decrypt the contents. Unfortunately, and this is basically why patches like this are necessary, OpenSSL has a very bad concept of sorting cipher suites: It just looks at the encryption algorithm (AES, CAMELLIA, ...) and its strength. For example, if you look at a snippet of the output of "openssl ciphers -v 'HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!DSS'": [...] ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 [...] Do you see it? AES256-* is preferred over the PFS-providing cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-... because the encryption algorithm is somewhat weaker that that one above. OpenSSL does not care weather SHA1 is used, no PFS is present, or anything else. Because of that, we need to build cipher suites (for web applications, client programs, and much more) by hand. <sarcasm>Of couse, we don't do security here...</sarcasm> In case there are any questions left, or you disagree with something, let me know. Best regards, Peter Müller > What would be the negative implications of this patch? Would existing tunnels on production servers stop working? > > > On Jan 21, 2018, at 2:55 PM, Paul Simmons <mbatranch@gmail.com> wrote: > > > >> On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: > >> Hello, > >> > >> since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort > >> of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's > >> say a week. > >> > >> Best, > >> -Michael > >> > >>> On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > >>> Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > >>> * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > >>> * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > >>> * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > >>> * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" > >>> problem) > >>> * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > >>> > >>> The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > >>> > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > >>> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > >>> Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > >>> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > >>> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > >>> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > >>> Mac=SHA1 > >>> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > >>> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > >>> Mac=SHA1 > >>> AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) > >>> Mac=AEAD > >>> AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > >>> AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > >>> Mac=AEAD > >>> AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > >>> AES256-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > >>> CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > >>> Mac=SHA1 > >>> AES128-SHA SSLv3 > >>> Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > >>> CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > >>> Mac=SHA1 > >>> > >>> This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve > >>> l/telco/2017-12-04). > >>> > >>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > >>> Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > >>> --- > >>> lfs/openssl | 2 +- > >>> src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > >>> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > >>> create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> > >>> diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > >>> index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > >>> --- a/lfs/openssl > >>> +++ b/lfs/openssl > >>> @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst > >>> %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > >>> @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf > >>> $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > >>> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > >>> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > >>> > >>> # i586 specific patches > >>> diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> new file mode 100644 > >>> index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > >>> --- /dev/null > >>> +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > >>> @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > >>> +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > >>> +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 > >>> 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > >>> ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 > >>> +0100 > >>> +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > >>> + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is > >>> substituted when > >>> + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with > >>> 'DEFAULT'. > >>> + */ > >>> +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > >>> "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > >>> ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > >>> "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: > >>> !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > >>> + /* > >>> + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in > >>> ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > >>> + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for > >>> DEFAULT is > > > > Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security > > discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to > > best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. > > > > Best, > > Paul Simmons
On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 13:54 -0600, Paul Simmons wrote: > On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: > > Hello, > > > > since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort > > of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's > > say a week. > > > > Best, > > -Michael > > > > On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > > > Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > > > * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > > > * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > > > * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > > > * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" > > > problem) > > > * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > > > > > > The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) > > > Mac=AEAD > > > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > > Mac=AEAD > > > AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve > > > l/telco/2017-12-04). > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > > > Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > > > --- > > > lfs/openssl | 2 +- > > > src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > > > index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > > > --- a/lfs/openssl > > > +++ b/lfs/openssl > > > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst > > > %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > > > @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf > > > $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > > > - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > > > + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > > > > > > # i586 specific patches > > > diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > new file mode 100644 > > > index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > > > --- /dev/null > > > +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > > > +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > > > +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 > > > 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > > > ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 > > > +0100 > > > +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > > > + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is > > > substituted when > > > + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with > > > 'DEFAULT'. > > > + */ > > > +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > > > ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: > > > !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > > > + /* > > > + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in > > > ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > > > + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for > > > DEFAULT is > > Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security > discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to > best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. I suppose you are referring to some users who are still running outdated machines with MS Exchange 2003 and things like that? Certainly that is a huge problem. However, we need to make sure that IPFire generally compatible with the rest of the world. There is no easy answer to this. Best, -Michael > > Best, > Paul Simmons
Hi, On Mon, 2018-01-22 at 13:55 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > Hello *, > > thanks for the comments. > > To avoid some misunderstandings here: The patch changes the > content of the DEFAULT cipher list of OpenSSL. This list is > used by programs such as curl and wget for establishing TLS > sessions. As far as I know, it does not have effect on VPN > components such as IPsec. This does *not* affect OpenVPN and IPsec tunnels because the ciphers are chosen in each of the tunnel's configurations. However, wget isn't affected either because we use GnuTLS for wget which won't compile against OpenSSL 1.1.0. Possibly GnuTLS requires the same configuration then. Please provide a second patch for the OpenSSL 1.1.0 because it does not make sense to get this right in next and then revert everything next month when we are going to roll out OpenSSL 1.1.0. > Further, insecure algorithm (3DES, RC4, MD5, ...) are still > supported by OpenSSL, since we have not disabled them during > the compilation support, which I aim to do in another patch. I am happy to remove RC4, but we cannot remove 3DES or MD5. Please send this for the OpenSSL 1.1.0 branch. > In case a program uses one of those algorithm, it still works. > This is because the DEFAULT cipher list does not contain all > ciphers supported by OpenSSL, but those which are chosen if > no specific algorithm keywords (HIGH, !aNULL, ...) are used. > > The negative impacts of this patch are: > (a) It might break TLS connections to _very_ outdated server > which still require weak and/or broken ciphers. But, as it > was in similar situations, that is the problem of those who > operate the servers. > > At the moment, I am not aware of such servers IPFire connects > to by default. Please drop me a line if I missed one. I don't think so. The proxy doesn't initiate any SSL connections on its own so I suppose we don't have anything that we can foresee. Mirrors which require outdated cryptography won't be eligible for us. > (b) Looking at the cipher list attached to the patch, you > probably notice that TLS 1.2 ciphers without PFS (AES256-GCM > and similar) are listed after TLS 1.0 ciphers with PFS. > > While this does not necessarily have performance impacts, it > is - with regard to security - a matter of discussion. In my > point of view, it is better to use a cipher provides PFS > (the transmitted contents cannot be decrypted afterwards) but > uses a weak message digest algorithm (SHA1) than using a TLS 1.2 > cipher with secure algos, but an attacker "just" need to > steal the private key and is able to decrypt the contents. Agreed. SHA1 might be broken in theory but it is not *that* broken. PFS is always preferred. > Unfortunately, and this is basically why patches like this > are necessary, OpenSSL has a very bad concept of sorting cipher > suites: It just looks at the encryption algorithm (AES, CAMELLIA, ...) > and its strength. For example, if you look at a snippet of the output of > "openssl ciphers -v 'HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!DSS'": > > [...] > ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > Mac=AEAD > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > [...] > > Do you see it? AES256-* is preferred over the PFS-providing cipher > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-... because the encryption algorithm is somewhat > weaker that that one above. OpenSSL does not care weather SHA1 is > used, no PFS is present, or anything else. Well it is indeed a very hard decision to make and possibly there is no clear answer that works for everyone. We here value security more than anything. An Android device would prefer compatibility over anything else and won't really care if it has chosen the best algorithms that were available. But cipher performance highly depends on the device IPFire is running on. I suppose this absolutely not important either for downloading some files here. > Because of that, we need to build cipher suites (for web applications, > client programs, and much more) by hand. <sarcasm>Of couse, we don't > do security here...</sarcasm> > > In case there are any questions left, or you disagree with something, let me > know. > > Best regards, > Peter Müller Best, -Michael > > > > What would be the negative implications of this patch? Would existing > > tunnels on production servers stop working? > > > > > On Jan 21, 2018, at 2:55 PM, Paul Simmons <mbatranch@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > > > > > since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort > > > > of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's > > > > say a week. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > -Michael > > > > > > > > > On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > > > > > Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > > > > > * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > > > > > * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > > > > > * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > > > > > * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" > > > > > problem) > > > > > * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > > > > > > > > > > The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > > > > > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) > > > > > Mac=AEAD > > > > > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > > > > Mac=AEAD > > > > > AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > > > > > This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve > > > > > l/telco/2017-12-04). > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > > > > > Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > > > > > --- > > > > > lfs/openssl | 2 +- > > > > > src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > > > > > index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > > > > > --- a/lfs/openssl > > > > > +++ b/lfs/openssl > > > > > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst > > > > > %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > > > > > @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf > > > > > $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > > > > > - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > > > > > > > > > > # i586 specific patches > > > > > diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > new file mode 100644 > > > > > index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > > > > > --- /dev/null > > > > > +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > > > > > +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > > > > > +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 > > > > > 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > > > > > ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 > > > > > +0100 > > > > > +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > > > > > + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is > > > > > substituted when > > > > > + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with > > > > > 'DEFAULT'. > > > > > + */ > > > > > +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > > > "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > > > > > ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > > > "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: > > > > > !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > > > > > + /* > > > > > + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in > > > > > ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > > > > > + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for > > > > > DEFAULT is > > > > > > Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security > > > discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to > > > best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. > > > > > > Best, > > > Paul Simmons
Hello, > Hi, > > On Mon, 2018-01-22 at 13:55 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > > Hello *, > > > > thanks for the comments. > > > > To avoid some misunderstandings here: The patch changes the > > content of the DEFAULT cipher list of OpenSSL. This list is > > used by programs such as curl and wget for establishing TLS > > sessions. As far as I know, it does not have effect on VPN > > components such as IPsec. > > This does *not* affect OpenVPN and IPsec tunnels because the ciphers are chosen > in each of the tunnel's configurations. > > However, wget isn't affected either because we use GnuTLS for wget which won't > compile against OpenSSL 1.1.0. Possibly GnuTLS requires the same configuration > then. > > Please provide a second patch for the OpenSSL 1.1.0 because it does not make > sense to get this right in next and then revert everything next month when we > are going to roll out OpenSSL 1.1.0. Okay, development is running... :-) @Michael: Speaking about OpenSSL 1.1.0: I saw you patching ClamAV to work with that version some time ago. It looks like the upcoming release (0.99.3) is linked against it by default (http://blog.clamav.net/2017/12/clamav-0993-beta2-has-been-released.html). Just thought you might want to know. Best regards, Peter Müller > > > Further, insecure algorithm (3DES, RC4, MD5, ...) are still > > supported by OpenSSL, since we have not disabled them during > > the compilation support, which I aim to do in another patch. > > I am happy to remove RC4, but we cannot remove 3DES or MD5. > > Please send this for the OpenSSL 1.1.0 branch. > > > In case a program uses one of those algorithm, it still works. > > This is because the DEFAULT cipher list does not contain all > > ciphers supported by OpenSSL, but those which are chosen if > > no specific algorithm keywords (HIGH, !aNULL, ...) are used. > > > > The negative impacts of this patch are: > > (a) It might break TLS connections to _very_ outdated server > > which still require weak and/or broken ciphers. But, as it > > was in similar situations, that is the problem of those who > > operate the servers. > > > > At the moment, I am not aware of such servers IPFire connects > > to by default. Please drop me a line if I missed one. > > I don't think so. The proxy doesn't initiate any SSL connections on its own so I > suppose we don't have anything that we can foresee. > > Mirrors which require outdated cryptography won't be eligible for us. > > > (b) Looking at the cipher list attached to the patch, you > > probably notice that TLS 1.2 ciphers without PFS (AES256-GCM > > and similar) are listed after TLS 1.0 ciphers with PFS. > > > > While this does not necessarily have performance impacts, it > > is - with regard to security - a matter of discussion. In my > > point of view, it is better to use a cipher provides PFS > > (the transmitted contents cannot be decrypted afterwards) but > > uses a weak message digest algorithm (SHA1) than using a TLS 1.2 > > cipher with secure algos, but an attacker "just" need to > > steal the private key and is able to decrypt the contents. > > Agreed. > > SHA1 might be broken in theory but it is not *that* broken. PFS is always > preferred. > > > Unfortunately, and this is basically why patches like this > > are necessary, OpenSSL has a very bad concept of sorting cipher > > suites: It just looks at the encryption algorithm (AES, CAMELLIA, ...) > > and its strength. For example, if you look at a snippet of the output of > > "openssl ciphers -v 'HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!DSS'": > > > > [...] > > ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > Mac=AEAD > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > [...] > > > > Do you see it? AES256-* is preferred over the PFS-providing cipher > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-... because the encryption algorithm is somewhat > > weaker that that one above. OpenSSL does not care weather SHA1 is > > used, no PFS is present, or anything else. > > Well it is indeed a very hard decision to make and possibly there is no clear > answer that works for everyone. We here value security more than anything. An > Android device would prefer compatibility over anything else and won't really > care if it has chosen the best algorithms that were available. > > But cipher performance highly depends on the device IPFire is running on. I > suppose this absolutely not important either for downloading some files here. > > > Because of that, we need to build cipher suites (for web applications, > > client programs, and much more) by hand. <sarcasm>Of couse, we don't > > do security here...</sarcasm> > > > > In case there are any questions left, or you disagree with something, let me > > know. > > > > Best regards, > > Peter Müller > > Best, > -Michael > > > > > > > > What would be the negative implications of this patch? Would existing > > > tunnels on production servers stop working? > > > > > > > On Jan 21, 2018, at 2:55 PM, Paul Simmons <mbatranch@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 19:08 +0000, Michael Tremer wrote: > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > > > > > since there usually is a few people being opinionated about this sort > > > > > of changes, I will wait a little until we get the comments in. Let's > > > > > say a week. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > -Michael > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, 2018-01-20 at 15:28 +0100, Peter Müller wrote: > > > > > > Only use secure cipher list for the OpenSSL DEFAULT list: > > > > > > * ECDSA is preferred over RSA since it is faster and more scalable > > > > > > * TLS 1.2 suites are preferred over anything older > > > > > > * weak ciphers such as RC4 and 3DES have been eliminated > > > > > > * AES-GCM is preferred over AES-CBC (known as "mac-then-encrypt" > > > > > > problem) > > > > > > * ciphers without PFS are moved to the end of the cipher list > > > > > > > > > > > > The DEFAULT cipher list is now ("openssl ciphers -v"): > > > > > > > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA > > > > > > Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) > > > > > > Mac=AEAD > > > > > > AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) > > > > > > Mac=AEAD > > > > > > AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 > > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 > > > > > > AES256-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) > > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > AES128-SHA SSLv3 > > > > > > Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) > > > > > > Mac=SHA1 > > > > > > > > > > > > This has been discussed at 2017-12-04 (https://wiki.ipfire.org/deve > > > > > > l/telco/2017-12-04). > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu> > > > > > > Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> > > > > > > --- > > > > > > lfs/openssl | 2 +- > > > > > > src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > create mode 100644 src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl > > > > > > index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 > > > > > > --- a/lfs/openssl > > > > > > +++ b/lfs/openssl > > > > > > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst > > > > > > %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) > > > > > > @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf > > > > > > $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) > > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch > > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch > > > > > > - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < > > > > > > $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch > > > > > > > > > > > > # i586 specific patches > > > > > > diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > new file mode 100644 > > > > > > index 000000000..9fb4051e3 > > > > > > --- /dev/null > > > > > > +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch > > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > > > > > > +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h > > > > > > +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 > > > > > > 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 > > > > > > ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 > > > > > > +0100 > > > > > > +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ > > > > > > + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is > > > > > > substituted when > > > > > > + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with > > > > > > 'DEFAULT'. > > > > > > + */ > > > > > > +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > > > > "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" > > > > > > ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST > > > > > > "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES: > > > > > > !MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" > > > > > > + /* > > > > > > + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in > > > > > > ssl/ssl_ciph.c always > > > > > > + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for > > > > > > DEFAULT is > > > > > > > > Since some IPFire users are ignorant of the latest and greatest security > > > > discussions, implementing this patch will help many of us to adhere to > > > > best practices. Therefore, I support this patch. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Paul Simmons
diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl index 6050768ec..65d738d0f 100644 --- a/lfs/openssl +++ b/lfs/openssl @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2a-rpmbuild.patch - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2h-weak-ciphers.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2g-disable-sslv2v3.patch # i586 specific patches diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9fb4051e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.0.2n-weak-ciphers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h +--- openssl-1.0.2n-orig/ssl/ssl.h 2017-12-07 14:16:42.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.2n/ssl/ssl.h 2018-01-20 11:56:02.477927590 +0100 +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ + * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when + * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. + */ +-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "kEECDH+ECDSA:kEECDH:kEDH:HIGH:+SHA:+kRSA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH:!IDEA:!SEED:!RC4:!kDH:!DSS" + /* + * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always + * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is